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We use a panel of developed and emerging countries for the period 1970-2008 to assess the 
cyclicality of education, health, and social security government spending. We mostly find 
acyclical behaviour, but evidence also points to counter-cyclicality for social security 
spending, particularly in OECD countries, consistent with the operation of automatic 
stabilizers. 
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1. Introduction  
 The cyclicality of government expenditure is an important issue, notably from a policy 
making perspective. Changes in notably in functional expenditure patterns may arise from 
discretionary actions by policy makers or from the operation of automatic stabilizers (see 
notably Granado et al., 2010). Using a large panel of advanced, emerging and developing 
countries we assess the cyclicality of three categories of functional public expenditure. Our 
analysis is an encompassing one since we consider, besides education and health spending, 
also government expenditure on social security and welfare, and we use a substantially large 
sample of countries and a long time span (1970-2008).  
 Most studies find that fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries and 
countercyclical or acyclical in advanced ones (see, inter alia, Tornell and Lane (1999), 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008)). A number of explanations have 
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been put forward to justify the different cyclical pattern in different groups of countries (see, 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) or Tornell and Lane (1999) for review). 
 In our analysis we find that education and health spending are mostly acyclical, while for 
total expenditures, and spending on social security and welfare, where evidence points to 
counter-cyclicality, particularly in OECD countries, highlighting in this context the relevance 
of this activity in the redistribution activity of the government. 
  
2. Data and Methodology 
 We collected data for a large set of advanced (OECD), emerging and developing countries 
(using the World Bank’s definition) between 1970 and 2008 from the World Development 
Indicators and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. We then transform our spending 
variables (education, health and social security)1 into log levels, deflated with the CPI at 2000 
prices (which matches the same reference year for real GDP). Following the related literature 
we estimate: 
 0 1 1 2it it it it it t i itEXP Y BB TOT               (1)  
 
where itEXP  is the change in the real value of the log of the expenditure item of interest and 
itY  is the real GDP growth rate. 1itBB  is the government’s budget balance (% GDP), which 
captures the potential effect of borrowing constraints on public spending. Countries with high 
initial budget deficits are perceived to be at a greater risk of debt default and as a result have 
less access to capital markets during recessions. They would be expected to exhibit a higher 
degree of pro-cyclicality. itTOT  is an index (its change) of the country’s terms of trade. The 
rate of change in the terms of trade is meant to capture the effects of external shocks on fiscal 
cyclicality. The impact of external shocks is often more pronounced in developing countries 
due to the close connection between the budget balance and the foreign sector. The remaining 
usual assumptions apply, in particular i  and t  are country specific and time effects – the 
latter to control for global shocks. 0  is the parameter of interest, measuring the degree of 
cyclicality: a positive estimate implies a pro-cyclical behaviour; a negative one indicates a 
countercyclical behaviour of the respective spending items. 
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3. Empirical results 
 The potential endogeneity is taken care by running Arelano-Bover (1995) SYS-GMM 
with appropriate lags of the regressors used as instruments.2 We begin by estimating (1) 
without control variables using annual data for the full, OECD and Emerging and Developing 
(E+D) samples. Our results, presented in Table 1, show that most GDP growth coefficients 
are mostly statistically insignificant for our spending categories, apart from evidence of 
countercyclical total government expenditures attributed to the OECD sub-group (which is in 
line with the literature) and a countercyclical pattern for expenditures in social security and 
welfare in the different samples, in line with Hallerberg and Strauch (2002) and Darby and 
Melitz (2008).  
 In addition, we need to notice that that level of counter-cyclicality for social spending is 
much stronger in the OECD countries that in the E+D countries, as can be seen by the much 
higher absolute value of the estimated coefficient for GDP in the first country group. This 
result can be understood due to the fact that more developed economies possess bigger social 
systems and more important welfare state features. 
[Table 1] 
 In Table 2 we report the estimated coefficients once the full set of controls are allowed 
for. In the case of the OECD the government expenditure coefficient remains statistically 
significant. Moreover, we keep the countercyclical result for spending on social security and 
welfare (for both the full and OECD samples).  
[Table 2] 
 Finally, given that functional public expenditure may respond asymmetrically, we test this 
hypothesis by accounting for so-called good and bad times’ periods. Therefore, we define 
good times as those in which the output gap is positive and bad times when the output gap is 
negative.3 Our results in Table 3 suggest that for the OECD, total government expenditure is 
countercyclical in both good and bad times, with the coefficient in bad times being 50% larger 
in absolute value (more negative). We keep the acyclicality result for education and health 
expenditures, and the countercyclical result for spending in social security and welfare is also 
maintained. In fact, in good times the estimated coefficient for social security spending is 
larger in magnitude (more negative). For emerging and developing countries our results are in 
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Fitzgerald alternatives didn’t qualitatively alter our main results. 
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line with Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) who report that after controlling for endogeneity, total 




 All in all, the functional spending items under analysis are mostly acyclical, with the 
exception of spending on social security and welfare (and total expenditures) where evidence 
points to counter-cyclicality, particularly in OECD countries. Therefore, when the economy is 
slowing down, social spending needs to pick up, and this is consistent with the fiscal 
automatic stabilizer narrative, and in the context of the redistribution responsibilities of the 
government. On the other hand, the acyclical behaviour of health and education spending 
depicts their more structural nature. Hence, this implies that an important part of government 
spending is rather rigid and more impervious to the business cycle, while such spending is 
also less easily reduced, notably in periods when fiscal retrenchment is warranted.  
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Total spending Education spending Health spending Social Security and Welfare 
spending 
Estimation SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
gdppcgr -2.16* -5.77*** -1.72 -0.17 -0.43 -0.14 -0.08 -0.23 -0.06 -0.63*** -3.68*** -0.24** 
 (1.198) (1.114) (1.361) (0.147) (0.286) (0.161) (0.049) (0.238) (0.048) (0.166) (0.874) (0.111) 
Observations 2,167 814 1,353 2,226 582 1,644 1,590 521 1,069 1,498 521 977 
Hansen (p-
value) 
0.19 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.26 0.40 0.21 0.51 0.13 0.41 0.26 0.22 
AB AR(1) 
(p-value) 
0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AB AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.37 0.14 0.72 0.16 0.42 0.18 0.55 0.17 0.26 0.45 0.95 0.39 
 
Note: The models are estimated by Two-Step robust System GMM (SYS-GMM). Lagged regressors are used as suitable 
instruments. The dependent variable is either total government expenditures, government expenditures on education, health or 
social security and welfare (all in % GDP), as identified in the first row. “E+M” denote the emerging and developing countries 
sub-group. Robust heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis below each coefficient estimate. The 
Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the 
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. A constant term has 
been estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 





Total spending Education spending Health spending Social Security and Welfare 
spending 
Estimation SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
             
gdppcgr -0.49 -4.56** 0.45 -0.29 -0.51* -0.08 -0.05 -0.24 -0.08 -0.83** -3.63*** -0.34 
 (0.841) (2.027) (0.984) (0.269) (0.304) (0.264) (0.123) (0.349) (0.087) (0.355) (1.281) (0.258) 
ToT gr -0.03 -0.12*** -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02** -0.03 -0.00 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.024) (0.007) 
govbal_gdp(-
1) 
0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01* 0.00 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
Observations 772 366 406 673 253 420 521 219 302 492 219 273 
Hansen (p-
value) 
0.13 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.15 0.12 0.36 0.34 
AB AR(1) 
(p-value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.09 0.05 
AB AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.06 0.50 0.08 0.31 0.67 0.25 0.27 0.53 0.26 1.00 0.39 0.07 









Total spending Education spending Health spending Social Security and Welfare 
spending 
Estimation SYS-GMM 
Sample All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D All OECD E+D 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Good times -0.35 -3.84* 1.11 -0.01 -0.83 0.07 -0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.80** -4.00*** -0.17 
 (1.020) (2.139) (1.328) (0.271) (0.580) (0.316) (0.123) (0.389) (0.123) (0.407) (1.369) (0.234) 
Bad times -2.09** -5.60** -1.33 -0.36 -0.37 -0.36 -0.12 -0.38 -0.18 -0.89** -2.87** -0.54 
 (1.006) (2.400) (1.149) (0.324) (0.291) (0.365) (0.083) (0.428) (0.112) (0.374) (1.462) (0.377) 
ToT gr -0.03 -0.11* -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04** -0.00 
 (0.026) (0.063) (0.030) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.019) (0.007) 
govbal_gdp(-
1) 
0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.01** 0.00 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
Observations 769 366 403 662 253 409 518 219 299 489 219 270 
Hansen (p-
value) 
0.33 0.51 0.12 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.42 0.33 0.11 0.24 0.17 0.38 
AB AR(1) 
(p-value) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.05 
AB AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.06 0.47 0.08 0.34 0.76 0.28 0.25 0.57 0.26 0.97 0.37 0.05 
Note: Note: as in Table 1. 
 
